找英语高手帮我翻译几句话很快就是我生日了,我想用英语写在空间上,但是自己英语水平太有限,所以恳请大家帮下忙翻译一下；
很幸运 生日和圣诞节撞在一起了
好久都没过属于自己的生日了
又大一岁了,_百度作业帮
找英语高手帮我翻译几句话很快就是我生日了,我想用英语写在空间上,但是自己英语水平太有限,所以恳请大家帮下忙翻译一下；
很幸运 生日和圣诞节撞在一起了
好久都没过属于自己的生日了
又大一岁了,
很快就是我生日了,我想用英语写在空间上,但是自己英语水平太有限,所以恳请大家帮下忙翻译一下；
很幸运 生日和圣诞节撞在一起了
好久都没过属于自己的生日了
又大一岁了,时间真是快.都21岁了生日愿望并不多,就希望哥哥的病赶快好起来,还等着他回去过新年呢,我也希望自己不要那么懒惰了,打起精神来,努力把自己想做的事情实现.
朋友们,祝福我吧.希望大家不是用软件翻译 那就没意义了 遇到两个用软件翻译的 谢谢
给你一个地道的英语口语表达法,没有逐字翻译,根据你的意思而写：It's very lucky that my birthday this year falls on the Christmas!It's a long time I haven't thrown my pals a birthday party of my own.I will one year older.Oh,time flies,I will be 21.I don't have many wishes for this birthday.I only hope my brother will be well soon,as I am waiting for him to go back home with me for the Chinese New Year.I also wish that I can stop being lazy,brace up and try to do what I wanna do.My dear friends,please offer me blessings.解释一下使用的几个词组：撞在一起：fall on,这个词组的意思是“什么事情刚好在哪一天发生”的意思时间真是快：time flies,这是一句英语谚语,固定结构,不宜改写.好久都没过属于自己的生日：我改写成“很久没有给我的朋友办一个我自己的生日派对”It's a long time I haven't thrown my pals a birthday party of my own.这样的表达法更地道.throw a party是英美人常说的,意思是大大的搞个派对.新年：Chinese New Year,写成英文,当表达为“中国新年”打起精神：brace up,另外cheer up也可以.brace up更有振作起来的意思.努力把自己想做的事情实现：实现什么什么是非常中文化的说法,简单地说：do what I wanna do就很地道了.祝你生日快乐,心想事成!
Lucky birthday and Christmas together for a long time no one hit over his own birthday And a year older, time is fast. All of the 21-year-old Not many birthday wishes on the hope that the br...
I feel so lucky to have my birthday on X'mas. It's been a long time since the last time I had a birthday which completely belongs to me. How time flies! I'm 21 now. I do not have many birthday wi...
Fortunately my birthday and Christmas will fall on the same day this year.I haven't spent my brithday for a long time.I'll be
one year older,how time flies,I'm becoming 21.I'm not asking too much,jus...
Beause my birthday is Christmas day so I feel very lucky. It's been a long time since the last time I had a birthday which completely belongs to me. How time flies! I'm 21 years old now. I don't have ...
It's sooo lucky that my birthday is on Christmas Day this year.I havn't celebrate my birthday for a long time！How time flies，I will soon one year older to 21.All my wishes is that my brother could rev...
Lucky birthday and Christmas together for a long time no one hit over his own birthday And a year older, time is fast. All of the 21-year-old Not many birthday wishes on the hope that the br...
Very lucky hit birthday and Christmas together for a long time not been his own birthday another year older, the time is really fast. All the birthday wishes 21-year-old is not much hope that his brot...
Lucky birthday and Christmas together for a long time no one hit over his own birthday And a year older, time is fast. All of the 21-year-old Not many birthday wishes on the hope that the br...
Lucky birthday and Christmas together for a long time no one hit over his own birthday And a year older, time is fast. All of the 21-year-old Not many birthday wishes on the hope that the br...
Very lucky hit birthday and Christmas together for a long time not been his own birthday another year older, the time is really fast. All the birthday wishes 21-year-old is not much hope that his brot...
I'm very lucky. My birthday and Christmas eve are on the day this year. I haven't had a birthday that is truly mine for a long time.I'm another year older, and time sure passes by fast - I'm alre...
Enter here are fortunate to be translated into a birthday and Christmas together for a long time did not have their own birthday another year older, the time is really fast. All the birthday wishes 21...译者的任务The&task&of&the&translator
花了两天的时间把这篇据说是最难理解的东西翻译了一遍，后边肯定还需要校对、纠错等等系列工作。
本雅明的文章原以德文写就，取名“DieAufgabe des
Ubersetzers”。我翻译的这篇来自于百度文库中的英译本，也不知道是不是全，但是我对照了一下其他有些人翻译的，应该说有删节。我其实没有看懂就开始翻译，指望了翻完了也就懂了！
目前中文世界通行的三个译本——1
张旭东译《译作者的任务》(见《》，牛津出版社1998年版)；2
乔向东译《翻译者的任务》(见《》1999年第1期)；3
陈永国译《翻译者的任务》(见《本雅明文选》，出版社1999版)——都是由佐恩的英译派生而来。由于资源有限，我在豆瓣上找到了张旭东的译本，据说是最好的翻译，我还没有看，等我吧自己的弄好在去看。附在后面，做参考吧。
Walter Benjamin. The Translation
Studies Reader. Lawrence Venuti (Ed.). London: Routledge. 2000:
In the appreciation of a work of art or an art form, consideration
of the receiver never proves fruitful. Art, in the same way, posits
man’s physical and spiritual existence, but in none of its works is
it concerned with his response. No poem is intended for the reader,
no picture for the beholder, no symphony for listener.
Is a translation meant for readers
who do not understand the original? For what does a literary work
“say”? What does it communicate? It “tells” very little to those
who understand it. Its essential quality is not statement or the
imparting of information. Yet any translation which intends to
perform a transmitting function cannot transmit anything but
information---hence, something inessential. This is the hall mark
of bad translations. But do we not generally regard as the
essential substance of a literary work what it contains in addition
to information---as even a poor translator will admit---the
unfathomable, the mysterious, the “poetic,” something that a
translator can reproduce only if he is also a poet? This, actually,
is the cause of another characteristic of inferior translation,
which consequently we may define as the (p. 15) inaccurate
transmission of an inessential content. This will be true whenever
a translation undertakes to serve the reader. However, if it were
intended for the reader, the same would have to apply to the
original. If the original does not exist for the reader’s sake, how
could the translation he understood on the basis of this
Translation is a mode. To comprehend
it as mode one must go back to the original, for that contains the
law governing the translation: its translatability. The question of
whether a work is translatable has a dual meaning. Either: Will an
adequate translator ever be found among the totality of its
readers? Or, more pertinently: Does its nature lend itself to
translation and, therefore, in view of the significance of the
mode, call for it? Analogously, the translatability of linguistic
creations ought to be considered even if men should prove unable to
translate them. Given a strict concept of translation, would they
not really be translatable to some degree? The question as to
whether the translation of certain linguistic creations is called
for ought to be posed in this sense. For this thought is valid
here: If translation is a mode, translatability must be an
essential feature of certain works.
Translatability is an essential
quality of certain works, which is not to say that it is essential
tha it means rather that a specific
significance inherent in the original manifests itself in its
translatability. It is plausible that no translation, however good
it may, can have any significance as regards the original. Yet, by
virtue of its translatability the original is closely connected
in fact, this connection is all the closer
since it is no longer of importance to the original.
Just as the manifestations of life
are intimately connected with the phenomenon of life without being
of importance to it, a translation issues from the original---not
so much from its life as from its afterlife.
For a translation comes later than
the original, and since the important works of world literature
never find their chosen translators at the time of their origin,
their translation marks their stage of continued life. The idea of
life and afterlife in works of art should be regarded with an
entirely unmetaphorical objectivity. Even in times of narrowly
prejudiced thought there was an inkling that life was not limited
to organic corporeality.
The concept of life is given its due
only if everything that has a history of its own, and is not merely
the setting for history, is credited with life. In the final
analysis, the range of life must (p. 16) be determined by history
rather than by nature, least of all by such tenuous factors as
sensation and soul. The philosopher’s task consists in
comprehending all of natural life through the more
encompassing life of
history. And indeed, is not the continued
life of works of art far easier to recognize than the continual
life of animal species? Translations that are more than
transmissions of subject matter come into being when in the course
of its survival a work has reached the age of its fame. Contrary,
therefore, to the claims of bad translators, such translations do
not so much serve the work as owe their existence to it. The life
of the originals attains in them to its ever-renewed latest and
most abundant flowering.
Being a special and high form of
life, this flowering is governed by a special, high purposiveness.
All purposeful manifestations of life, including their very
purposivenesss, in the final analysis have their end not in life,
but in the expression of its nature, in the representation of its
significance. Translation thus ultimately serves the purpose of
expressing the central reciprocal relationship between languages.
It cannot possibly reveal or establish this hidden relationship
but it can represent it by realizing it in embryonic or
intensive form. As for the posited central kinship of languages, it
is marked by a distinctive convergence. Languages are not strangers
to one another, but are, a priori and apart from all historical
relationships, relationships, interrelated in what they want to
(back to traditional translation
theory)If the kinship of languages is to be demonstrated by
translations, how else can this be done but by conveying the form
and meaning of the original as accurately as possible? To be sure,
that theory would be hard put to define the nature of this accuracy
and therefore could shed no light on what is important in a
translation. Actually, however, this kinship of languages is
brought out by a translation far more profoundly and clearly than
in the superficial and indefinable similarity of two works of
literature.
To grasp the genuine relationship
between an original and a translation requires an investigation
analogous to the argumentation by which a critique of cognition
would have to prove the impossibility of an image theory. There it
is a matter of showing that in cognition there could be no
objectivity, not even a claim to it, if it dealt with images of
there it can be demonstrated that no translation would be
possible if in its ultimate essence it strove for likeness to the
original. For in its afterlife, the original undergoes a change.
Even words with fixed meaning can undergo a maturing process. The
obvious tendency of a writers’ literary style may in time wither
away. (p. 17)
What sounded fresh once may sound
what was once current may someday sound quaint.
And even if one tried turn an author’s last stroke of the pen into
the coup de gr&ce of his work, this still would not save that dead
theory of translation. For just as the tenor and the significance
of the great works of literature undergo a complete transformation
over the centuries, the mother tongue of the translator is
transformed as well. While a poet’s words endure in his own
language, even the greatest translation is destined to become part
of the growth of its own language and eventually to be absorbed by
its renewal. Translation is so far removed from being the sterile
equation of two dead languages that of all literary forms, it is
the one charged with the special mission of watching over the
maturing process of the original language and the birth pangs of
If the kinship of languages manifests
itself in translations, this in not accomplished through a vague
alikeness between adaptation and original. It stands to reason that
kinship does not necessarily involve likeness. Wherein resides the
relatedness of two languages, apart from historical considerations?
Certainly not in the similarity between works of literature or
works. Rather, all suprahistorical kinship of languages rest in the
intention underlying each language as a whole---an intention,
however, which no single language can attain by itself but which is
realized only by the totality of their intentions supplementing
each other: pure language.
While all individual elements of
foreign languages---word, sentences, structure---are mutually
exclusive, these languages supplement one another in their
intentions. Without distinguishing the intended object from the
mode of intention, no firm grasp of this basic law of a philosophy
of language can be achieved. The words Brot and pain “intend” the
same object, but the modes of this intention are not the same. It
is owing to these modes that the word Brot means something
different to a German than the word pain to a Frenchman, that these
words are not interchangeable for them, that, in fact, they strive
to exclude each other.
brotpainBrotpain
As to the intended object, however,
the two words mean the very same thing. While the modes of
intention in these two words are in conflict, intention and object
of intention complement each of the two languages from which they
there the object is complementary to the intention. In
the individual, unsupplemented languages, meaning is never found in
relative independence, as in individua rather,
it is in a constant state of flux---until it is able to emerge as
pure language from the harmony of all the various modes of
intention. Until then, it remains hidden in the language. If,
however, these languages continue to grow in this manner until the
end of their (messianic) time, (messianic) it is translation which catches
fire on the eternal life of the works and the perpetual renewal of
language. Translation keeps putting the hallowed growth of (p. 19)
languages to the text: How far removed is their hidden meaning from
revelation, how close can it be brought by the knowledge of this
remoteness?
Although translation, unlike art,
cannot claim permanence for its products, its goal is undeniably a
final, conclusive, decisive stage of all linguistic creation. In
translation the original rises into a higher and purer linguistic
air, as it were, in a singularly impressive manner, at least it
points the way to this region: the predestined, hitherto
inaccessible realm of reconciliation and fulfillment of languages.
This transfer can never be total, but what reaches this region is
that element in a translation which goes beyond transmittal of
subject matter.
Even when all the surface content has
been extracted and transmitted, the primary concern of the genuine
translator remains elusive. Unlike the words of the original, it is
not translatable, because the relationship between content and
language is quite different in the original and the translation.
While content and language form a certain unity in the original,
like a fruit and it skin, the language of the translation envelops
its content like a royal robe with ample folds. For it signifies a
more exalted language than its own and thus remains unsuited to its
content, overpowering and alien. This disjunction prevents
translation and at the same time makes it superfluous.
For any translation of a work
originating in a specific stage of linguistic history represents,
in regard to a specific aspect of its content, translation into all
other languages. Thus translation, ironically, transplants the
original into a more definitive linguistic realm since it can no
longer be displaced by a secondary rendering. The original can only
be raised there anew and at other points of time.
The task of the translator consists
in finding that intended effect [Intention] (p. 19) upon the
language into which he is translating which produces in it the echo
of the original. Unlike a work of literature, translation does not
find itself in the center of the language forest but on the outside
fac it calls into it without entering, aiming
at that single spot where the echo is able to give, in its own
language, the reverberation of the work in the alien one. The
intention of the poet is spontaneous, primary, that of the
translator is derivative, ultimate, ideational. If there is such a
thing as a language of truth, the tensionless and even silent
depository of the ultimate truth which all thought strives for,
then this language of truth is---the true language. And this very
language, whose divination and description is the only perfection a
philosopher can hope for, is concealed in concentrated fashion in
translations. There is no muse of philosophy, nor is there one of
translation.
Indeed, the problem of ripening the
seed of pure language in a translation seems to be insoluble,
determinable in no solution. The traditional concepts in any
discussion of translations are fidelity and license---the freedom
of faithful reproduction and, in its service, fidelity to the word.
These ideas seem to be no longer serviceable to a theory that looks
for other things in a translation than reproduction of meaning. To
be sure, traditional usage makes these terms appear as if in
constant conflict with each other. What can fidelity really do for
the rendering of (p. 20) meaning?
Fidelity in the translation of
individual words can almost never fully reproduce the meaning they
have in the original. For sense in its poetic significance is not
limited meaning, but derives from the connotations conveyed by the
word chosen to express it. We say of words that they have the
emotional connotations. A literal rendering of the syntax
completely demolishes the theory of reproduction of meaning and is
a direct threat to comprehensibility.
可理解性的一种直接威胁。
The nineteenth century consider
H&lderlin’s translations of Sophocles as monstrous examples of such
literalness. Finally, it is self-evident how greatly fidelity in
reproducing the form impedes the rendering of the sense. Thus no
case for literalness can be based on a desire to retain the
meaning. Meaning is served far better---and literature and language
far worse---by the unrestrained license of bad translators. Of
necessity, therefore, the demand for literalness, whose
justification is obvious, whose legitimate ground is quite obscure,
must be understood in a more meaningful context.
19荷尔德林翻译的萨福克里斯作品就是这种直译最典型的败笔。这也最终也在很大程度上自我证实了对形式的忠实复制是如何阻碍对意义的表达的。因此，从没有直译是要保持源语的意义。而那些不受限制的自由派低水平翻译者，却更多的重视了意义——文学和语言要差得多。直译的理由很明显，但是合理性却非常含混，因此对直译的理解必须一个意义更丰富的语境下去理解。
Fragments of a vessel which are to be
glued together must match one another in the smallest details,
although they need not be like one another. In the same way a
translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original,
must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original’s mode of
signification, thus making both the original and the translation
recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments
are part of a vessel. For this very reason translation must in
large measure refrain from wanting to communicate something, from
rendering the sense, and in this original is important to it only
insofar as it has already relieved the translator and his
translation of the effort of assembling and expressing what is to
be conveyed.
In the realm of translation, too, the
words έν ăρҳή ήν ŏ λόγο& [in the beginning was the word] apply. On
the other hand, as regards the meaning, the language of a
translation can---in fact, must---let itself go, so that it gives
voice to the intention of the original not as reproduction but as
harmony, as a supplement to the language in which it expresses
itself, as its own kind of intention. Therefore it is not the
highest praise of a translation, particularly in the age of its
origin, to say that it reads as if it had originally been written
in that language. Rather, the significance of fidelity as ensured
by literalness is that the work reflects the great longing for
linguistic complementation.
A real transl it
does not cover the original, does not black its light, but allows
the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium to shine
upon the original all the more fully. This may be achieved, above
all, by a literal rendering of the syntax which proves words rather
than sentences to be the primary element of the translator. For if
the sentence is the wall before the language of the original,
literalness is the arcade.
Fidelity and freedom in translation
have traditionally been regarded as conflicting tendencies. This
deeper interpretation of the one apparently does not serve to
in fact, it seems to deny the other all
justification. For what is meant by freedom but that the rendering
of the sense is no longer to be regarded as all-important? Only if
the sense of a linguistic creation may be equated with the
information it conveys does some ultimate, decisive element
remain beyond all communication---quite close and yet infinitely
remote, concealed or distinguishable, fragmented or
In all language and linguistic
creations there remains in addition to what can be conveyed
something that cannot be (p. 21) depending on the
context in which it appears, it is something that symbolizes or
something symbolized. It is the former only in the finite products
of language, the latter in the evolving of the languages
themselves. And that which seeks to represent, to produce itself in
the evolving of languages, is that very nucleus of pure language.
Though concealed and fragmentary, it is an active force in life as
the symbolized thing itself, whereas it inhabits linguistic
creations only in symbolized form.
While that ultimate essence, pure
language, in the various tongues is tied only to linguistics
elements and their changes, in linguistic creations it is weighted
with a heavy, alien meaning. To relieve it of this, to turn the
linguistic flux, is the tremendous and only capacity of
translation. In this pure language---which no longer means or
expresses anything but is, as expressionless and creative Word,
that which is meant in all languages---all information, all sense,
and all intention finally encounter a stratum in which they are
destined to be extinguished.
This very stratum furnishes a new and
higher justification
this justification does
not derive from the sense of what is to be conveyed, for the
emancipation from this sense is the task of fidelity. Rather, for
the sake of pure language, a free translation bases the test on its
own language. It is the task of the translator to release in his
own language that pure language which is under the spell of
another, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his
re-creation of that work. For the sake of pure language he breaks
through decayed barriers of his own language.
Luther, Voss, H&lderlin, and George
have extended the boundaries of the German language. ---And what of
the sense in its importance for the relationship between
translation and original? A simile may help here. Just as a tangent
touches a circle lightly and at but one point, with this touch
rather than with the point setting the law according to which it is
to continue on its straight path to infinity, a translation touches
the original lightly and only at the infinitely small point of the
sense, thereupon pursuing its own course according to the laws of
fidelity in the freedom of linguistic flux.
Luther, Voss,
H&lderlin,
Without explicitly naming or
substantiating it, Rudolf Pannwits has characterized the true
significance of this freedom. His observations are contained in Die
Krisis der europ&ischen Kultur and rank with Goethe’s Notes to the
West&stlicher Divan as the best comment on the theory of
translation that has been published in Germany. Pannwits writes:
“Our translations, even the best ones, proceed from a wrong
Rudolf PannwitsDie Krisis der europ&ischen
KulturWest&stlicher
DivanPannwits
They want to turn Hindi, Greek,
English into German instead of turning German into Hindi, Greek,
English. Our translators have a far greater reverence for the usage
of their own language than for the spirit of the foreign works….
The basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in
which his own language happens to be instead of allowing his
language to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue.
Particularly when translating from a language very remote from his
own he must go back to the primal elements of language itself and
penetrate to the point where work, image, and tone
He must expand and deepen his
language by means of the foreign language. It is not generally
realized to what extent this is possible, to what extent any
language can be transformed, how language differs from language
almost the way dialect
however, this last is
true only if one takes language seriously enough, not if one takes
it lightly.”
The extent to which a translation
manages to be in keeping with the nature of (p. 22) this mode is
determined objectively by the translatability of the original. The
lower the quality and the distinction of its language, the larger
the extent to which it is information, the less fertile a field is
it for translation, until the utter preponderance of content, far
from being the lever for a translation of distinctive mode, renders
it impossible.
The higher the level of a work, the
more does it remain translatable even if its meaning is touched
upon only fleetingly. This, of course, applies to originals only.
Translations, on the other hand, proves to be untranslatable not
because of any inherent difficulty, but because of the looseness
with which meaning attaches to them. Confirmation of this as well
as of every other important aspect is supplied by H&ldlin’s
translations, particularly those of the two tragedies by
Sophocles.
H&ldlinSophocles
In them the harmony of the languages
is so profound that sense is touched by language only the way an
Aeolian harp is touched by the wind. H&ldlin’s translations are
prot they are to even the most perfect
renderings of their texts as a prototype is to a model. This can be
demonstrated by comparing H&ldlin’s and Rudolf Borchardt’s
translations of Pindar’s Third Pythian Ode. For this very reason
H&ldlin’’s translations in particular are subject to the enormous
danger inherent in all translations: the gates of a language thus
expanded and modified may slam shut and enclose the translator with
H&ldlinH&ldlinRudolf Borchardt
Pindar’s Third Pythian
OdeH&ldlin
H&ldlin’s translations from Sophocles
in them meaning plunges from abyss to abyss
until it threatens to become lost in the bottomless depths of
language. There is, however, a stop. It is vouchsafed to Holy Writ
alone, in which meaning has ceased to be the watershed for the flow
of language and the flow of revelation.
Sophocles H&ldlin
Where a text is identical with truth
of dogma, where it is supposed to be “the true language” in all its
literalness and without the mediation of meaning, this text is
unconditionally translatable. In such case the original, language
and revelation are one without any tension, so the translation must
be one with the original in the form of the interlinear version, in
which literalness and freedom are united. For to some degree all
great texts contain their potential translati
this is true to the highest degree of sacred writings. The
interlinear version of the Scriptures is the prototype or ideal of
all translation. (p. 23)
张旭东译本：
在欣赏艺术作品或艺术形式的过程中，观赏者的因素从未带给人什么收获。谈论什么公众或其代表人物在此只能使人误入歧途，甚至连“理想的”接受者这个概念在探讨艺术时也有害无益，因为它无非是设定了自身的本质和在场性。艺术以同样的方式设定了人的肉体和精神的存在，然而艺术作品却从未关注过人对它的回应。从来没有哪一首诗是为它的读者而作的，从来没有哪一幅画是为观赏家而画的，也从没有哪首交响乐是为听众而谱写的。
　　那么译作是为不懂原作的人准备的么？如果是的话，这倒是以说明在艺术领域里不谙原作的读者有多么广大了。再说，这似乎也是把“同样的话”再说一遍唯一可以想见的理由。可是一部文学作品到底“说”了什么？它在同我们交流什么呢？对那些领会了作品的人，它几乎什么也没“告诉”他们。文学作品的基本特性并不是陈述事实或发布信息。然而任何执行传播功能的翻译所传播的只能是信息，也就是说，它传播的只是非本质的东西。这是拙劣译文的特征。但是人们普遍认为为文学作品的实质是信息之外的东西。就连拙劣的译者也承认，文学作品的精髓是某种深不可测的、神秘的、“诗意的”东西；翻译家如要再现这种东西，自己必须也是一个诗人。事实上，这带来了劣质翻译的另一特点，我们不妨称之为不准确地翻译非本质内容。只要译作迎合读者，这种情况就会发生。其实要是原作是为读者而写的话，它也会陷入同样的境地。可是，如果原作者并不为读者而存在，我们又怎样来理解不为读者而存在的译作呢？
　　翻译是一种样式。把它理解为样式，人们就得返诸原作，因为这包含了支配翻译的法则：可译性。问一部作品是否可译是一个双重问题。它要么是问：在这部作品的全体读者中能不能找到一个称职的译者？要么它可以更恰当地问：这部作品的本质是否将自己授予翻译，并在充分考虑到翻译这种样式的重要性之后，呼喊着译作呢？从原则上讲，第一个问题取决于偶然性，而第二个问题取决于必然性。只有肤浅的头脑才会否认第二个问题的独立性，才会把两个问题看得同样重要。我们应当指出，某些相关的概念只有当同人联系起来时才有意义，有时或许竟获得其终极的蕴含。比方说一个生命或一个瞬间是不能忘怀的，尽管所有人都把它们遗忘了。如果这个生命或瞬间的本质要求我们永远记住它，这个要求并不因为人们的遗忘而落空，而是变成了一个人们未能满足的要求，同时也向我们指出了一个满足了这一要求的领域：上帝的记忆。以此作类比，语言作品的可译性即使在人确实无法翻译的时候也应给予考虑。严格说来，任何作品在某种程度上都是无法翻译的。我们应该在这个意义上问，一部文学作品是不是在召唤翻译？因为这种想法是正确的：如果翻译是一种样式，可译性必须是特定作品的本质特性。
　　可译性也是特定作品的一个基本特征，但这并不是说这些作品就一定要被翻译；不如说，原作的某些内在的特殊意蕴通过译作而显露出来。可以说，译作无论多么完善，也无法取代原作的重要性，但原作却可以通过可译性而同译作紧密地联系在一起。事实上，正因为译作对原作是无足轻重的，它才更为紧密地同原作联系起来。我们不妨把这种联系视为天然的，或者更进一步，把它视为译作同原作间的生命线。正如生活的表象虽与生活的现象密切相关却对之不构成任何重要性，译作也以原作为依据。不过它依据的不是原作的生命，而是原作的来世。翻译总是晚于原作，世界文学的重要作品也从未在问世之际就有选定的译者，因而它们的译本标志着它们生命的延续。对于艺术作品的现世与来世的观念，我们应从一个全然客观而非隐喻的角度去看。即便在狭隘的思想偏见充斥于世的时代，人们也隐约地感到生命并不限于肉体存在。不过我们既不能像费希纳（Fechner）那样将生命的领域置于灵魂的孱弱权威之下，也不能反其道而行之，以感官刺激这类更不确定的动物性因素来界定生命，因为这些因素只是偶尔地触及到生命的本质。只有我们把生命赋予一切拥有自己的历史，而不仅仅构成历史场景的事物，我们才算是对生命的概念有了一个交待。在我们最终的分析中，生命的范围不是由自然来决定，更不是由感官刺激或灵魂这类贫乏空洞的因素来决定，而是必须由历史来决定。哲学家的人物在于通过更为丰富多彩的历史生活去理解自然生命。无疑，艺术作品生命的延续比动物物种的生命延续易于辨认。伟大艺术作品的历史告诉我们，这些作品的渊源，它们在艺术家的生活时代里的实现，以及它们在后世里的潜在的永生。这种潜在永生的具体表现叫做名声。如果一部译作不仅仅是传递题材内容，那么它的面世标志着一部作品进入了它生命延续的享誉阶段。与拙劣译者的看法相反，这样的翻译不是服务于原作，而是其整个存在都来自原作。而原作的生命之花在其译作中得到了最新的也是最繁盛的开放，这种不断的更新使原作青春常驻。
　　这种特殊的、高级的生命更新体现了一种特殊的、高级的目的性。生命与目的之间的关系看似一目了然，实则几乎无法由人的才智所把握。在目的性的范围内，所有单一具体的功能都服务于这个目的，但我们却必须在一个更高的层面上理解这个目的。只有这样我们才能揭示生命与其目的性之间的关系。在分析的终端我们会看到，一切生命的有目的的呈现，包括其目的性本身，其目的都不在于生命本身，而在于表达自己的本质，在于对自身意义的再现。而译作在终极意义上正服务于这一目的，因为它表现出不同语言之间的至关重要的互补关系。翻译不可能自己揭示或建立这一暗藏的关系，但它却可以通过把它实现于初级的或强烈的形式之中而显现这一关系。这种赋予暗藏的意义以可感性的初级尝试旨在再现这种意义，其本质是如此独特，以至它几乎从未同非语言的生命领域遭遇。这一特性以其种种类比和象征带来了暗示意义的其他方式，它们不像意义的强烈实现方式那样充满预言性和提示性。置于诸语言间的预设的亲族关系，其特征在于一种明显的重合性。因为不同的语言彼此从来不是陌路人。它们相互间不仅有着各种各样的历史瓜葛，更在先验的意义上通过它们所要表达的事物而勾连在一起。
　　在这些徒劳的说明之后，我们的探讨又回到了传统翻译理论。如翻译可以展示语言的亲族关系，它就得尽可能精确地传达原作的形式和意义。不言而喻，这种传统理论难以规范精确性，因而对我们理解翻译的要旨无其裨益。事实上，诸语言间的亲族关系在译作的体现远比两部文学作品之间表面的、不确定的相似性来得深刻而清澈。把握原作与译作之间的真实关联需要这样一种研讨，它类似于认知批判论证影像理论的不可能性。我们知道在认知过程中根本没有客观性可言，甚至连声称客观性的可能都没有，因为我们在此面对的是现实的影像。同样，我们也可以表明，如果译作的终极本质仅仅是挣扎着向原作看齐，那么就根本不可能有什么译作。原作在它的来世里必须经历其生命的改变和更新，否则就不成其来世。即便意义明确的字句也会经历一个成熟的过程。随着时间的流逝，某个作者文学风格中的明显倾向会逐渐凋萎，而其文学创作的内在倾向则会逐渐抬头。此时听上去令人耳目一新的辞藻彼时或许会变成老生常谈，曾经风靡一时的文章日后或许会显得陈腐不堪。可是如果我们不在语言及其作品的生命本身之中，而是在其后世繁衍的主观性中寻找这种变化的本质，我们就不仅陷入幼稚的心理主义，而且混淆了事物的起因和事物本质。更重要的是，这意味着以思想的无能去否定一个最有力、最富于成果的历史过程。即便我们试图用作者自己的文字为其作品作盖棺之论，也同样无法挽救那种了无生机的翻译理论。因为不仅伟大的文学作品要在数世纪的过程中经历全盘转化，译者的母语也处在不断的转化过程中。诗人的语句在他们各自的语言中获得持久的生命，然而与此同时，就连最伟大的译作也注定要成为其语言发展的一部分，并被吸收进语言的自我更新之中。译作绝非两种僵死语言之间的干巴巴的等式。相反，在所有文学形式中，它承担着一种特别使命。这一使命就是在自身诞生的阵痛中照看原作语言的成熟过程。
　　如果语言亲族关系体现于译作之中的话，这种体现并不成就于原作于其改编本之间的微弱的相似。常识告诉我们，血亲间不一定貌似。我们在这里使用的亲族概念同它通用的严格意义是一致的。在这两种场合中，单由身世渊源来定亲族是不够的，尽管在定义其狭义用法上起源的概念仍然必不可少。除了在对历史的思考中，我们还能在哪里找到两种语言间的相似性呢？这种相似性自然不在文学作品或词句之间。相反，任何超历史的语言间的亲族关系都依赖于每一种语言各自的整体性意图。不过这种意图并不是任何语言单独能够实现，而是实现于所有这些意图的互补的总体之中。这个总体不妨叫做纯语言。既使不同外国语的个别因素，诸如词汇、句子、结构等等是彼此排斥的，这些语言仍在意图中相互补足。我们只有区分开意向性的对象和意向性的样式才能牢牢地把握住语言学的基本法则。Brot（德文，意为“面包”）和pain（法文“面包”）“意指”着同一个对象，但它们的意向性样式却不同。由于意向性样式的不同，brot对于德国人的以为和pain对于法国人的以为是不一样的，也就是说，这两个词不能互换，事实上，它们都在努力排斥对方。然而对于意向性对象而言，它们的意思没什么两样。这两个词的意向性样式之间有冲突，然而意向性和意向性对象却使这两个词变得互补，它们自己也正来自两种互补的语言中，只有在这里，意向性和它的对象间才是相辅相成的。在单一的，没有被其他语言补充的语言中，意义从来没有像在个别字句里那样出现在相对的独立性之中，相反，意义总是处于不断的流动状态，直到它能够作为纯语言从各式各样的意向性样式的和谐中浮现出来。在此之前，意义仅仅隐藏在不同的语言里面。要是诸语言以这种方式继续成长，直到它们寿命的尽头，那么正是译作抓住了作品的永恒生命并置身于语言的不断更新之中。因为译作不断把诸语言令人敬畏的成长付诸检验，看看它们隐藏的意义距意义的敞露还有多远，或者关于这一距离的知识能让我们把这一距离缩小到何等程度。
　　无疑，这也就是说，一切翻译都只是对付语言的外来性或异己性的权宜之计。事实上对语言的这种外来性或异己性只有权宜之计，因为任何一劳永逸的解决都在人类的能力之外，至少我们没有现成的办法。宗教的发展为语言的更高层次的成熟准备了条件，这也许为这一问题提供了间接的解决办法。翻译同艺术作品不同，它无法宣称其作品的永恒性。但翻译的目标却是所有语言创造活动的一个定了形的、最终的、决定性的阶段，这一点是不容置疑的。不妨说，在译作中，原作达到了一个更高、更纯净的语言境界。自然，译作既不能永远停留在这个境界里，也无法占有这个境界的全部。但它的确以一种独特的、令人刮目相看的方式指示出走向这一境界的路径。在这个先验的、不可企及的境界里，语言获得了自身的和解，从而完成了自己。这种转移从来不是整体性的，但译作中达到这一领域的成分便是超越了传递题材内容的成分。这一内核由不可译的成分组成，而这也许正是它的最佳定义。
　　即便所有的表面内容都被捕获和传递，一个真正的译作者最关心的东西仍然是难于把握的。这种东西与原作的字句不同，它是不可译的，因为内容和语言之间的关系在原作和译作里颇为不同。在原作中，内容和语言像果实和果皮一样结合成一体，但翻译语言却像一件皇袍一样包裹着原作，上面满是皱褶。译作指向一种比它自身更具权威性的语言，因而它在高高在上的、异己的内容面前显得无所适从。这种脱节现象既阻碍了翻译，又使翻译变得多余。就作品内容的特定方面来讲，一旦一部作品在其特殊的语言史中被翻译成另一种语言，它也就等于被带入了所有的语言。因而具有讽刺意味的是，译作倒是把原作移植进一个更确定的语言领域，因为在此它不能第二次被搬动。原作只能在另一时间被重新抬出。“讽刺意味”这个字眼令人想起浪漫主义者，这并不仅仅是巧合。浪漫主义者对于文学作品的生命比一般人更富于洞察力，这种洞察力在翻译上得到了最大程度的证明。当然，他们对这种意义上的翻译几乎视而不见，而是全身心地投入了批评；但批评却正是文学作品的生命延续的另一种较弱的因素。虽然浪漫主义者在他们的理论文献里忽视了翻译，但他们留下的伟大译作却映证了他们对翻译这一文学样式的本质和尊严的领悟。大量例子告诉我们，诗人并不见得是这种悟性的最佳体现。事实上，诗人有可能对此最麻木不仁。就连文学史也没有支持这样一种传统观念，即大诗人也是杰出的译者，而差些的诗人则是平庸的译者。有些最杰出人物作为译者的重要性渊源胜过其作为创作者的重要性，这样的人里包括路德（Luther），弗斯（Voss）和施莱格尔（Schlegel）。他们中一些佼佼者也不能单单算作诗人，因为他们作为译者的重要性是不容忽视的，这些人里就有荷尔德林和格奥尔格（Stefan
George）。既然翻译是自成一体的文学样式，那么译者的工作就应该被看作诗人工作的一个独立的、不同的部分。
　　译者的工作是在译作的语言里创作出原作的回声，为此，译者必找到作用于这种语言的意图效果，即意向性。翻译的这一基本特征不同于诗人的作品，因为诗人的努力方向从不是语言自身或语言的总体，而仅是直接地面向语言的具体语境。与文学作品不同的是，译作并不将自己置于语言密林的中心，而是从外而眺望林木相向的山川。译作呼唤原作但却不进入原作，它寻找的是一个独一无二的点，在这个点上，它能听见一个回声以自己的语言回荡在陌生的语言里。译作的目标迥异于文学作品的目标，它指向语言的整体，而另一种语言里的个别作品不过是出发点。不仅如此，译作更是一种不同的劳作。诗人的意图是自发、原生、栩栩如生的；而译者的意图则是派生、终极性、观念化的。译作的伟大主题是将形形色色的口音熔于一种真正的语言。在这种语言里，个别句子、文学作品，或批评的判断彼此无法沟通，因为它们都依赖于译作；然而在译作里，不同的语言本身却在各自的意指方式中相互补充、相互妥协，而最终臻于和谐。如果真理的语言真的存在，如果终极的真理能和谐甚至是静静地落座（所有的思想都在为此奋斗），那么这种语言就是真正的语言。它的预言和描写是哲学家所能希望的唯一的完美形式，但这种形式只隐藏在译作的专注而密集的样式中。哲学没有自己的缪斯，译作也没有。但尽管矫情的艺术家这样一口咬定，哲学和译作却不是机械的、功利的东西。曾有一位哲学天才，他的特征就是渴望一种在译作中表达自己的语言。“语言的不完美性在于其多重性，我们找不到尽善尽美的语言：思考是光秃秃的写作，没有装饰，甚至没有窃窃私语。不朽的词语仍沉默着。世上各种各样的惯用语使任何人都无法说出那些本可以一举将真理具体化的词语。”如果马拉美（Mallarm&）的这番话对于哲学家来说有着明确的含义，那么译作正带有这种真正的语言的成分，它在诗与信条的中间。译作的个性也许不是鲜明触目，但它们在历史上同样留下了深刻的印记。
　　如果我们这样看译者的任务，解决问题的道路就更显得晦暗不明，困难重重了。如何让纯语言的种子在译作中成熟，这简直是不可解决的问题。如果对感性世界的复制不再是决定性的，那么解决这个问题的基础不就瓦解了么？在反面意义上，这正是上述一切的意义。在任何有关翻译的讨论中，传统概念都包括两点：一是忠实于原著，二是译文自身的不拘一格。后者说的是再创造的自由，而前者指的是服务于这种自由的对词句的忠实。但如果某种理论在译作中寻找的不是再创造的意义，而是别的什么东西，那么上述观念就没用了。当然，在传统用法里，译文的自由与忠实于原著好像总是处于冲突状态。忠实对于达意有什么帮助呢？在译作中，对个别词句的忠实翻译几乎从来不能将该词句在原作中的本义复制出来。因为诗意的韵味并不局限于意义，而是来自精心挑选的词语所传达和表现的内涵。我们都知道词语有种种情感的内涵。照搬句式则会完全瓦解复制意义的理论，同时对可理解性造成威胁。在十九世纪，人们认为荷尔德林译的索福克勒斯（Sophocles）正是这种直译的怪物。不言而喻，忠实于复制形式会损害达意。因此，在他们看来，保存意义的愿望不能成为直译的依凭。但是拙劣译者的随意性虽然有助于达意，却无助于文学和语言本身。直译的理由是一目了然的，但直译的合法性基础却不明朗，因此，我们有必要在一个更有意义的语境里来领会对直译的要求。如果我们要把一只瓶子的碎片重新黏合成一只瓶子，这些碎片的形状虽不用一样，但却必须能彼此吻合。同样，译作虽不用与原作的意义相仿，但却必须带着爱将原作的表意模式细致入微地吸收进来，从而使译作和原作都成为一个更伟大的语言的可以辨认的碎片，好像它们本是同一个瓶子的碎片。为了这个目的，译作必须大力克制那种要传达信息、递送意义的愿望。原作之所以重要，正因为它业已免去了译作和译者组织和表达内容的工作。“太初有道”这句话同样适用于翻译领域。另一方面，翻译的语言能够——事实上是必须——使自己从意义里摆脱出来，从而再现原作的意图（intentio）。这一切不是复制，而是译作自身的意图。它和谐地补足了原作的语言。因而如果说一部译作读起来就好像原作是用这种语言写成的，这并不是对该译作的最高赞誉，在译作问世的时代就尤其如此。相反，由直译所保证的忠实性之所以重要，是因为这样的译作反映出对语言互补性的伟大向往。一部真正的译作是透明的，它不会遮蔽原作，不会挡住原作的光芒，而是通过自身的媒介加强了原作，使纯语言更充分地在原作中体现出来。我们或许可以通过对句式的直译做到这一点。在这种直译中，对于译者来说基本的因素是词语，而不是句子。如果句子是矗立在原作语言面前的墙，那么逐字直译就是拱廊。
　　翻译的忠实性和自由在传统看法里是相互冲突的两种倾向。对其中一种倾向的更深入阐释并不能调和两者。事实上，这看上去只像是剥夺另一种倾向的合理性。自由的意思如不是认为达意并不是高于一切的目的，它又意味着什么呢？只有当语言的创造性作品的意味可以同它所传递的信息等同起来，某种终极的、决定性的因素才变得不可企及；它们会显得近在咫尺又无比遥远，深藏不露或是无从区分，支离破碎或者力大无穷。在一切语言的创造性作品中都有一种无法交流的东西，它与可以言传的东西并存。它或是象征什么，或是由什么所象征，视其语境而定。前者存在于有限的语言作品里，后者则存在于诸语言自身的演进之中。而那种寻求表现、寻求在诸语言的演化中将自己不断创造出来的东西，正是纯语言的内核。虽然这一内核藏而不露，支离破碎，它却是生活中的积极因素，因为它是被象征性地表现出来的事物本身，它只是以象征的形式栖身在语言作品之中。在不同的语言中，纯语言这种终极本质与种种语言学的要素和变化联系在一起，而在语言的创造性作品中，它却还负担着沉重的、异己的意义。译作重大的、唯一的功能就是使纯语言摆脱这一负担，从而把象征的工具变成象征的所指，从而在语言的长流中重获纯语言。这种纯语言不再意谓什么，也不再表达什么，它是托付在一切语言中的不具表现性的、创造性的言词。在这种纯语言中，所有的信息，所有的意味，所有的意图都面临被终止的命运。这个纯语言的层面为自由的翻译提供了新的、更高的理由；这个理由并不来自于内容的意味，因为从这种意味中解放出来正是忠实翻译的任务。不如说，为了纯语言的缘故，一部自由的译作在自己语言的基础上接受这个考验。译者的任务就是在自己的语言中把纯语言从另一种语言的魔咒中释放出来，是通过自己的再创造把囚禁在作品中的语言解放出来。为了纯语言的缘故，译者打破了他自己语言中的种种的腐朽的障碍。路德、弗斯、荷尔德林和格奥斯格都拓展了德语的领域。——意味在译作和原作的关系中有什么重要性呢？我们不妨作个比方。一个圆的切线只在一点上同圆轻轻接触，由此便按照其既定方向向前无限延伸。同样，译作只是在意味这个无限小的点上轻轻地触及原作，随即便在语言之流的自由王国中，按照忠实性的法则开始自己的行程。潘维茨（Rudolf
Pannwitz）虽没有在表面上命名或具体界定这种自由，但他却已经为我们描绘了这种自由的真正含义。他的《欧洲文化的危机》（Die Krisis der europaischen
Kultur）同歌德有关西亚诗选的笔记并列为德国翻译理论的最佳描述。潘维茨写道：“我们的译作，甚至是最好的译作，都往往从一个错误的前提出发。这些译作总是要把印地语、希腊语、英语变成德语，而不是把德语变成印地语、希腊语、英语。我们的翻译家对本国语言的惯用法的尊重远胜于对外来作品内在精神的敬意。……翻译家的基本错误是试图保存本国语言本身的偶然状态，而不是让自己的语言受到外来语言的有力影响。当我们从一种离我们自己的语言相当遥远的语言翻译时，我们必须回到语言的最基本的因素中去，力争达到作品。意象和音调的聚汇点。我们必须通过外国语言来扩展和深化本国语言。人们往往认识不到我们能在多大程度上做到这一点，在多大程度任何语言都能被转化，认识不到语言同语言间的区别同方言与方言间的区别是多么相像。不过，只有当人们严肃地看待语言，才能认识到后者的正确性。”
　　一部译作能在多大程度上与这种模式的本质保持一致，客观地取决于原作的可译性。原作的语言品质愈低、特色愈不明显，它就愈接近信息，愈不利于译作的茁壮成长。对翻译这种特殊的写作模式而言，内容不是一个杠杆，反倒是一个障碍，一旦内容取得绝对优势，翻译就变得不可能了。反之，一部作品的水准愈高，它就愈有可译性，那我们只能在一瞬间触及它的意义。当然，这只是对原作而言。译作本身是不可译的，这不但是因为它本身固有的种种困难，更因为它同原作意义之间的结合是松散的。荷尔德林译的索福克勒斯悲剧二种在各方面都应证了上述观察。在荷尔德林的译文里，不同语言处于深深的和谐之中，而语言触摸意味的方式就如同吹奏竖琴。荷尔德林的译作是同类作品的原型和样板。我们只要比较一下荷尔德林和布克哈特（Rudolf Borchardt）对品达（Pindar）的第三首达尔菲阿波罗神殿额（Third Pythian
Ode）的不同翻译就能表明这一点。但正因为这样，荷尔德林的译作也面临内在于一切翻译的巨大危险：译者所拓展和修饰的语言之门也可能一下子关上，把译者囚禁在沉寂中。荷尔德林所译的索福克勒斯是他一生中最后的作品；在其中意义从一个深渊跌入另一个深渊，直到像是丢失在语言的无底的深度之中。不过有一个止境。它把自己奉献给了《圣经》。在此，意义不再是语言之流和启示之流的分水岭。当一个文本与真理和信条等同，当它毋须意义的中介而在自己的字面上为“真正的语言”，这个文本就具备了无条件的可译性。在这种情况下，人们只是因为语言的多样性而要翻译。在太初，语言和启示是一体的，两者间不存在紧张，因而译作和原作必然是以逐行对照的形式排列在一起的，直译和翻译的自由是结合在一起的。一切伟大的文本都在字里行间包含着它的潜在的译文；这在神圣的作品中具有最高的真实性。圣经不同文字的逐行对照本是所有译作的原型和理想。
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