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+1-580-284-2652 Click on a business name for more information or More FBO and AIrport Information[海贼王]FAIRY LAW,第7章 房间×打扫×铺床（修）,[海贼王]FAIRY LAW快眼看书,眼快看书
(类别：玄幻魔法&&作者：妖狐依姬)
[海贼王]FAIRY LAW
第7章 房间×打扫×铺床（修）
&&&&推开木门，里面的摆设很简单，只有一张木床，连被子什么的都还没有，其余的也几乎都是空空的。看小说首发推荐去眼快看书&&&&“菲尔是女生，这里离我们这些臭男人有些距离，所以你不会受到太多的打扰，你要不要先进去休息一下，我去杂物室，拿些床上用品来。”&&&&“嗯，谢谢你，艾斯。”&&&&看着艾斯离开后，女孩也转身走进了她的房间，因为一直没有人住，所以到处都是灰尘，于是女孩决定清理一下，首先去提一桶水来吧。&&&&住宿区的构造其实没有想象中那么简单，因为白胡子海贼船上有很多人，上千人是完全不成问题的，即使船很大，但是还是得充分利用，所以住宿区的房间总是一间挨着一间，然后道路也是弯弯曲曲的，要是索隆来了的话，绝对会迷路到死亡尽头吧！&&&&其实，说是弯弯曲曲也不准确，它只是有几个十字路口，然后其他的也就像里面的虚夜宫一样，都是笔直的，然后房间就一间挨着一间，中间隔着一堵不太厚的墙壁。&&&&而每隔二十个房间就会有一个公共浴室，占地还算大，在这里面的构造倒像是现世学校里面的浴室一样，厕所与浴室都在一个小小的房门内，但是只有10个位置，所以有些人都直接在过道上洗澡了，这对她来说，倒是挺不方便的。&&&&菲尔来到浴室，随便找了个木桶，便接了一桶水，提到了房间内，然后拿起房间角落里放着的一些补满灰尘的帕子，便开始清理工作了。&&&&“嗯？需要帮忙吗？”庸懒的声音在女孩身后响起。&&&&正在擦拭木床的女孩回头一看，只见马尔科正倚靠在门框，高大的身躯需要稍稍弯腰才能进来。&&&&“马尔科队长……您到我这里来做什么？找艾斯么？”&&&&“不，来看看你收拾的怎么样了，艾斯那个白痴怎么把你一个人丢下了？”马尔科稍稍弯了弯腰便走了进来。&&&&“嗯，艾斯他去杂物室拿些床上用品来，啊，床的话已经擦过了，马尔科队长可以坐在床上等一会儿，艾斯应该快回来了。”说完，女孩又再次提着桶到墙角开始擦拭木制墙壁了。&&&&“喂喂……我可不是来休息的啊。”马尔科看着女孩无视了自己的存在直接走到了墙角，随即也跟了上来，一手拿过女孩手中的抹布，说道：“你去休息吧，剩下的我来。”&&&&“呃……没关系的，这样太麻烦您了。”&&&&“这可是队长的命令哟~”&&&&“……那好吧，谢谢您，马尔科队长。”女孩毕恭毕敬地点了点头以示谢意，然后就转身走向刚刚擦拭干净的木床。&&&&“菲娅莉，不用对我用敬语。”听见身后传来的话语，菲尔不禁回头看了看正在擦木板的男人。&&&&“哎，这也是队长的命令么？”&&&&“不，我们从今天起就是一家人了不是吗？对家人不需要用敬语了吧~”马尔科回过头，微微一笑，而那一笑震的女孩内心久久不能平静。&&&&“啊……是！我知道了，马尔科队长。”&&&&“话说回来，为什么你叫艾斯他们就是直呼其名，而叫我总是要加个‘队长’的后缀呢？”马尔科回过头继续手中的工作。&&&&“嗯……呵呵，因为你就是我的队长嘛！嘿嘿。”其实才不是呢，因为你拥有一护sama的声音，而里面出现频率最高的一个名词性词语就是——“队长”！&&&&而妞儿之所以叫他队长，不还是为了想从他的声音方面找到一些当年看的啊！！&&&&“……算了。”&&&&“我回来了！哦，马尔科，你也在这里啊！”就在这个时候，艾斯抱着一大堆东西回来了。&&&&“因为经常都有会新人加入我们，所以杂物室有很多套新的床上用品，菲尔你先起来一下。”&&&&“嗯。”菲尔听话地站起身，走到一旁，只见艾斯将床上用品往床一放，便开始自行铺了起来。&&&&“啊，艾斯，我自己来就好了！”女孩走上前去，拉住艾斯，已经麻烦了他带自己到房间来，而且又去帮自己拿了这些东西回来，现在怎么可以再麻烦他帮自己铺床呢？！虽然……感觉很幸福呢！&&&&“没事没事，你从今天开始就是我妹妹了，难得船上有个女孩子，你和我年纪又很相近，我当然要好好照顾一下菲尔啦！”看着艾斯灿烂的笑脸，她妥协了。&&&&“呃……那我也一起来吧！”&&&&“噢！菲尔你到那边去拉一下，一开始要铺平，要不然以后睡起来就不舒服！”&&&&“嗯！我知道了！”在铺床过程中，她发现艾斯真的是个很好的大哥哥，虽然表面总是大大咧咧的样子，但是做起事来真的挺认真的，而且照顾起人来也是有一套的，毕竟和路飞相处了那么些年，也不是白当了一阵哥哥的啊！&&&&“喂喂，你们两个……”倒是把我忘的一干二净啊。&&&&“嗯？马尔科队长刚刚说了什么吗？”因为妞儿是吸血鬼，所以听力很发达，听到了马尔科小声的嘀咕声，便停下了手中的活，转头看向马尔科，刚刚只顾和艾斯说笑了，完全忘记了墙角还有一位……-_-‖&&&&“……没什么。”&&&&——————————————————————————————————————————&&&&“谢谢你们今天帮了这么大的忙，以后有什么事尽管吩咐。”菲尔向门口的两位鞠了个躬。&&&&“你怎么还这么见外呢，对哥哥不需要这么客气，有什么不方便或者需要帮忙的尽管来找我吧！我在204号房间。”艾斯摸了摸女孩的脑袋，笑着说道。&&&&“嗯，我知道了。”&&&&“喂，艾斯，菲娅莉可是我的队员啊，有事也是找我才对吧！”马尔科不满地说道，“我就在这条过道转弯第一间房间，105号房间。”&&&&“嗯，话说，这房间是怎么安排的啊？”&&&&“大体上是自己选择，只不过是在自己的番队选择，每个番队的序号也就是最前面的1，2等等，不过每个番队的0，1，2号房间都是作为浴室合并在了一起，3号是杂物室，所以只有剩下的04到99号是寝室。”马尔科解释道。&&&&“是这样啊……”虽然看着这些个大男人的似乎都不怎么修边幅，但是船上这些细节倒是分的很清楚呢。&&&&看来今后的生活，还不算混乱嘛，只要洗澡的时候避开所有男生，上厕所时避开所有男生，平时把门关好一点，应该……就没有什么问题了吧！？不对，她应该要相信白胡子海贼团的兄弟姐妹们都是素质比较好的人！（素质好吗！！？）
欢迎您访问,From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article has an unclear citation style. The references used may be made clearer with a different or consistent style of , , or . (October 2014)
The examples and perspective in this article deal primarily with the United States and do not represent a
of the subject. Please
and discuss the issue on the . (January 2014)
In law, standing or locus standi is the term for the ability of a party to demonstrate to the
sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. Standing exists from one of three causes:
The party is directly subject to an adverse effect by the statute or action in question, and the harm suffered will continue unless the court grants relief in the form of damages or a finding that the law either does not apply to the party or that the law is void or can be nullified. This is called the "something to lose" doctrine, in which the party has standing because they directly will be harmed by the conditions for which they are asking the court for relief.
The party is not directly harmed by the conditions by which they are petitioning the court for relief but asks for it because the harm involved has some reasonable relation to their situation, and the continued existence of the harm may affect others who might not be able to ask a court for relief. In the United States, this is the grounds for asking for a law to be struck down as violating the , because while the plaintiff might not be directly affected, the law might so adversely affect others that one might never know what was not done or created by those who fear they would become subject to the law – the so-called "" doctrine.
The party is granted automatic standing by act of law. Under some environmental laws in the United States, a party may sue someone causing pollution to certain waterways without a federal permit, even if the party suing is not harmed by the pollution being generated. The law allows them to receive a portion of any fines collected by the government from their violation of law. In some U.S. states, a person who believes a book, film or other work of art is obscene may sue in their own name to have the work banned directly without having to ask a District Attorney to do so.
In the United States, the current doctrine is that a person cannot bring a suit challenging the
of a law unless the
can demonstrate that he/she/it is or will "imminently" be harmed by the law. Otherwise, the court will rule that the plaintiff "lacks standing" to bring the suit, and will dismiss the case without considering the merits of the claim of unconstitutionality. To have a court declare a law unconstitutional, there must be a valid reason for the lawsuit. The party suing must have something to lose in order to sue unless it has automatic standing by action of law.
created the first international court before which individuals have automatic locus standi.
, whether an individual has standing to bring an application for judicial review, or an appeal from the decision of a tribunal, is governed by the language of the particular statute under which the application or the appeal is brought. Some statutes provide for a narrow right of standing while others provide for a broader right of standing.
Frequently a litigant wishes to bring a
against a public body or official. This is considered an aspect of administrative law, sometimes with a constitutional dimension, as when the litigant seeks to have legislation declared unconstitutional.
developed the concept of public interest standing in three constitutional cases commonly called "the Standing trilogy": , , and . The trilogy was summarized as follows in :
It has been seen that when public interest standing is sought, consideration must be given to three aspects. First, is there a serious issue raised as to the invalidity of legislation in question? Second, has it been established that the plaintiff is directly affected by the legislation or if not does the plaintiff have a genuine interest in its validity? Third, is there another reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the court?
Public-interest standing is also available in non-constitutional cases, as the Court found in Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance).
In British administrative law, the applicant needs to have a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates. This sufficient interest requirement has been construed liberally by the courts. As
"[i]t would...be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group...or even a single public spirited taxpayer, were prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped."
Australia has a
understanding of locus standii or standing which is expressed in
such as the ADJR and common law decisions of the
especially the case Australian Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth (1980). The test for Standing is: 1. Do the party have special interest in the matter.
2. Is that interest too distant?
There is no open standing unless statute allows it or represents needs of a specified class of people. The issue is one of remoteness.
Standing may apply to class of aggrieved people where, essentially the closeness of the
to the subject matter is the test.
Furthermore, a plaintiff must show that he or she has been specially affected in comparison with the public at large.
Also, while there is no open standing per se,
have a low burden in establishing standing.
Australian Courts also recognise
(friend of the court),. and the various
have a presumed standing in
has stated, "In essence the question of standing is whether the
is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues."
There are a number of requirements that a plaintiff must establish to have standing before a federal court. Some are based on the
requirement of the judicial power of , . As stated there, "The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . .[and] to Controversies . . ." The requirement that a plaintiff have standing to sue is a limit on the role of the judiciary and the law of Article III standing is built on the idea of separation of powers. Federal courts may exercise power only "in the last resort, and as a necessity".
doctrine of standing is assumed as having begun with the case of ,
(1923). But legal standing truly rests its first prudential origins in , (1922) which was authored by Justice Brandeis. In Fairchild, a citizen sued the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to challenge the procedures by which the
was ratified. Prior to it the doctrine was that all persons had a right to pursue a private prosecution of a public right. Since then the doctrine has been embedded in
and some .
In 2011, in , the U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has standing to challenge the federal statute he or she is charged with violating as being unconstitutional under the .
There are three standing requirements:
Injury-in-fact: The plaintiff must have suffered or imminently will suffer injury—an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent (that is, neither conjectu not abstract). The injury can be either economic, non-economic, or both.
Causation: There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, so that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party who is not before the court.
Redressability: It must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that a favorable court decision will redress the injury.
Additionally, there are three major prudential (judicially created) standing principles. Congress can override these principles via statute:
Prohibition of : A party may only assert his or her own rights and cannot raise the claims of a third party who is
exceptions exist where the third party has interchangeable economic interests with the injured party, or a person unprotected by a particular law sues to challenge the oversweeping of the law into the rights of others. For example, a party suing over a law prohibiting certain types of visual material, may sue because the
rights of theirs, and others engaged in similar displays, might be damaged.
Additionally, third parties who do not have standing may be able to sue under the
doctrine if the third party is an infant, mentally handicapped, or not a party to a contract. One example of a statutory exception to the prohibition of third party standing exists in the
provision of the Civil .
Prohibition of generalized grievances: A plaintiff cannot sue if the injury is widely shared in an undifferentiated way with many people. For example, the general rule is that there is no federal taxpayer standing, as complaints about the spending of federal funds are too remote from the process of acquiring them. Such grievances are ordinarily more appropriately addressed in the representative branches.
Zone of interest test: There are in fact two tests used by the United States Supreme Court for the zone of interest
Zone of injury - The injury is the kind of injury that Congress expected might be addressed under the statute.
Zone of interests - The party is arguably within the zone of interest protected by the statute or constitutional provision.
In 1984, the Supreme Court reviewed and further outlined the standing requirements in a major ruling concerning the meaning of the three standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability.
In the suit, parents of black public school children alleged that the Internal Revenue Service was not enforcing standards and procedures that would deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not have the standing necessary to bring suit. Although the Court established a significant injury for one of the claims, it found the causation of the injury (the nexus between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s injuries) to be too attenuated. "The injury alleged was not fairly traceable to the Government conduct respondents challenge as unlawful".
In another major standing case, , 504 U.S. 555 (1992), the Supreme Court elaborated on the redressability requirement for standing. The case involved a challenge to a rule promulgated by the
interpreting §7 of the
(ESA). The rule rendered §7 of the ESA applicable only to actions within the United States or on the high seas. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not have the standing necessary to bring suit, because no injury had been established. The injury claimed by the plaintiffs was that damage would be caused to certain species of animals and that this in turn injures the plaintiffs by the reduced likelihood that the plaintiffs would see the species in the future. The court insisted though that the plaintiffs had to show how damage to the species would produce imminent injury to the plaintiffs. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not sustain this burden of proof. "The 'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured". The injury must be imminent and not hypothetical.
Beyond failing to show injury, the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the standing requirement of redressability. The Court pointed out that the respondents chose to challenge a more generalized level of Government action, "the invalidation of which would affect all overseas projects". This programmatic approach has "obvious difficulties insofar as proof of causation or redressability is concerned".
In a 2000 case, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), the
endorsed the "partial assignment" approach to
relator standing to sue under the
— allowing private individuals to sue on behalf of the U.S. government for injuries suffered solely by the government.
The initial case that established the doctrine of standing, , was a taxpayer standing case.
Taxpayer standing is the concept that any person who pays taxes should have standing to file a
against the taxing body if that body allocates funds in a way that the
feels is improper. The
has held that taxpayer standing is not by itself a sufficient basis for standing against the , unless the narrower
is met. The Court has consistently found that the conduct of the federal government is too far removed from individual taxpayer returns for any injury to the taxpayer to be traced to the use of tax revenues, e.g., .
In , the Court extended this analysis to state governments as well. However, the Supreme Court has also held that taxpayer standing is constitutionally sufficient to sue a
States are also protected against lawsuits by their . Even where states waive their sovereign immunity, they may nonetheless have their own rules limiting standing against simple taxpayer standing against the state. Furthermore, states have the power to determine what will constitute standing for a litigant to be heard in a state court, and may deny access to the courts premised on taxpayer standing alone.
In , a taxpayer has standing to sue if the state government is acting unconstitutionally with respect to public funds, or if government action is causing some special injury to the taxpayer that is not shared by taxpayers in general. In , the
has more or less adopted a similar rule. An individual taxpayer generally has standing to challenge an act of a city or county where they live, but does not have general standing to challenge state expenditures.
With limited exceptions, a party cannot have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless they will be subjected to the provisions of that statute. There are some exceptions, however, e.g. courts will accept
challenges to a statute on overbreadth grounds, where a person who is only partially affected by a statute can challenge parts that do not affect them on the grounds that laws that restrict speech have a
on other people's right to free speech.
The only other way someone can have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute is if the existence of the statute would otherwise deprive them of a right or a privilege even if the statute itself would not apply to them. The Virginia Supreme Court made this point clear in the case of
607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005). Martin and Ziherl were girlfriend and boyfriend and engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse when Martin discovered that Ziherl had infected her with , even though he knew he was infected and did not inform her of this. She sued him for damages, but because (at the time the case was filed) it was illegal to commit "fornication" (sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married), Ziherl argued that Martin could not sue him because joint tortfeasors - those involved in committing a crime - cannot sue each other over acts occurring as a result of a criminal act (Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721 (Va. 1990)). Martin argued in rebuttal that because of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
(finding that state's sodomy law unconstitutional), Virginia's anti-fornication law was also unconstitutional for the reasons cited in Lawrence. Martin argued, therefore, she could, in fact, sue Ziherl for damages.
Lower courts decided that because the Commonwealth's Attorney doesn't prosecute
cases and no one had been prosecuted for fornication anywhere in Virginia in over 100 years, Martin had no risk of prosecution and thus lacked standing to challenge the statute. Martin appealed. Since Martin has something to lose - the ability to sue Ziherl for damages - if the statute is upheld, she had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute even though the possibility of her being prosecuted for violating it was zero. And since the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence has found that there is a privacy right in one's private, noncommercial sexual practices, the Virginia Supreme Court decided that the statute against fornication was unconstitutional. The finding gave Martin standing to sue Ziherl since the decision in Zysk is no longer applicable.
However, the only reason Martin had standing to challenge the statute was that she had something to lose if it stayed on the books.
State law on standing differs substantially from federal law and varies considerably from state to state.
On December 29, 2009, the
for the Sixth District ruled that California Code of Civil Procedure Section 367 cannot be read as imposing a federal-style standing doctrine on California's code pleading system of civil procedure. In California, the fundamental inquiry is always whether the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has some entitlement to judicial action separate from proof of the substantive merits of the claim advanced. The court acknowledged that the word "standing" is often sloppily used to refer to what is really , and held that jus tertii in state law is not the same thing as the federal standing doctrine.
Lee, E Mason Ellis, Josephine (December 3, 2012). . Northwestern Law Review 107: 169.
Smith, Rhona K. M., Textbook on International Human Rights. 4th Edition. 2010.
For example, under s. 18(1) the Federal Court Act, an application for review may be made by "anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which the relief is sought".
, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138.
, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265.
, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575.
, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236
Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 .
Supreme Court Act 1981 s.31(3).
Inland Revenue Commissioners Appellants v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. Respondents [1982] A.C. 617.
Australian Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth ( CLR 493 AustLii
Re McB Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) .
(2001)(tampa case)
, Queensland Public Interest Law Clearing House Incorporated
Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth (1980)
Sinclair v Marybourough Mining Warden (1975)
Justice Brian J Preston,.
Onus v Alcoa
By M.R.L.L Kelly, Administrative Law Law Briefs (Pearson Education Australia, 2009),
see Transurban v Allan (1999)
(1986) 13 FCR 306
Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd ( CLR 27
re S Exparte Rundle (1991) WAR295
Truth about Motorways v Macquarie (2007)
(2001)(Tampa case)
US tobacco v Minister for Consumer Affairs(1988) 20 FCR 520.
, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 752 (1984).
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, by Steven L. Winter, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, July, 1988.
For example,
(global warming caused by EPA's refusal to regulate
emissions satisfied element of causation for Massachusetts's alleged injury of loss of coastland).
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 752 (1984).
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 755 (1984).
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 757 (1984).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 568.
Nathan D. Sturycz, The King and I?: An Examination of the Interest Qui Tam Relators Represent and the Implications for Future False Claims Act Litigation, 28 St. Louis Pub. L. Rev. 459 (2009), available at . For the general standing rule, , 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
547 U.S. 332 (2006).
, 180 Cal. App. 4th 980 (2009).
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